

# The Giant is Threatened:

## narratives of hatred and radicalism in Brazil 2018

**Abstract:** This paper addresses the perceived polarization climate between opposers and supporters of the former PT government, before the 2018 presidential campaign, to understand how its discourses manifested through the media, and if it can be related to the eruption of political violence. By Content Analysis, the study features four relevant happenings in recent Brazilian political history, revealing the language of contention (TILLY; TARROW, 2015) between politicians, and also in the mainstream media. Drawing from Benoit's Functional Theory of Political Campaign Discourses (2007), we found that hatred and polarization have been the common ground in Brazilian politics, and tested two frameworks for the eruption of political violence (HARFF, 2003; BENESH, 2011), providing an understanding of the immediate threats that linger over the country's democracy.

**Keywords:** Political Communication. Political hatred. Brazilian politics. Permanent campaigning.

### O gigante ameaçado: narrativas de ódio e radicalismo no Brasil 2018

**Resumo:** Este artigo aborda o clima de polarização percebido entre opositores e apoiadores do ex-governo do PT, antes da campanha presidencial de 2018, para entender como seus discursos se manifestaram pela mídia e se pode estar relacionado à erupção da violência política. Pela Análise de Conteúdo, o estudo apresenta quatro acontecimentos relevantes na história política brasileira recente, revelando a linguagem da disputa (TILLY; TARROW, 2015) entre políticos e também na grande mídia. Com base nos Teoria Funcional dos Discursos de Campanha Política de Benoit (2007), descobrimos que o ódio e a polarização têm sido o ponto comum na política brasileira e testamos duas estruturas para a erupção da violência política (HARFF, 2003; BENESH, 2011), fornecendo uma compreensão das ameaças imediatas que persistem sobre a democracia do país.



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**Palavras-chave:** Comunicação Política. Ódio Político. Política Brasileira. Campanha permanente.

## **El Gigante amenazado: narrativas de odio y radicalismo en Brasil 2018**

**Resumen:** Este documento aborda el clima de polarización percibido entre opositores y simpatizantes del antiguo gobierno del PT, antes de la campaña presidencial de 2018, para comprender cómo se manifestaron sus discursos a través de los medios de comunicación y si puede relacionarse con la erupción de la violencia política. Según Content Analysis, el estudio presenta cuatro acontecimientos relevantes en la historia política brasileña reciente, que revela el lenguaje de la contienda (TILLY; TARROW, 2015) entre políticos, y también en los principales medios de comunicación. Partiendo de la Teoría Funcional de los Discursos de Campaña Política de Benoit (2007), descubrimos que el odio y la polarización han sido el terreno común en la política brasileña, y probamos dos marcos para la erupción de la violencia política (HARFF, 2003; BENESH, 2011), proporcionando una comprensión de las amenazas inmediatas que persisten sobre la democracia del país.

**Palabras clave:** Comunicación Política. Odio Político. Política Brasileña. Campanha permanente.

### **1 Introduction**

Despite an oppressive slavery past and marked social issues, hate speech wasn't a regular feature in Brazilian everyday talking - nor academia. Even though, it has always been a part of Brazilian culture, at least for those who really wanted to see it, and not just for racial or religious matters. It debut followed an unprecedented period of large demonstrations held through the country mainly in opposition to Dilma Rousseff's government and the Worker's Party (PT) administration. Through decades, large demonstrations used to be a prerogative of the leftist militancy, however, the 2013 events showed the appropriation of this specific repertoire (TILLY; TARROW, 2015) - the public demonstration - by a large and heterogeneous group of people, in opposition to the political status quo, represented by the government of Dilma Rousseff. On the other hand, a fair amount of demonstrations were held in support of PT government, building the contentious repertoire, both in actions and language, giving room to hatred expressions show up, and establishing the conditions to the public confrontation: co-existence.

**Image 1** - Demonstrators occupy the Congress building in Brasilia (DF) in June, 2013.



Fonte: Valter Campanato / Agência Brasil

On 06/20/2013, 1.4 million people protested throughout the country. In Brasília, the federal capital, demonstrators tried to take the Congress and the Federal Government headquarter, the Planalto Palace. Clashing with the police, 130 people was injured in Brasilia (DF); more than 60 in Rio de Janeiro (RJ) and, in São Paulo, one demonstrator was hit and killed by a car trying to go through the demonstration.

The wave of rage against an alleged government inefficacy continued in 2014. During that year, at least 144 demonstrations occurred in opposition to the FIFA World Cup and the public money spending. In January, 25<sup>th</sup>, 128 demonstrators were arrested in São Paulo (SP). Twelve months later, 13 people had lost their lives during demonstrations - and none those deaths was directly related to clashes with the police. One of the most chocking cases, is the killing of Santiago Andrade. The cameraman, on duty covering the protests for Bandeirantes Television, was hit in the head by a rocket thrown by the mob.

**Image 2** - Moment when a rocket hits a cameraman causing his death in February, 2014.



Fonte: Agência O Globo

History is filled with cases where daily basis conflicts escalated to extreme violent confrontations, like civil wars, mass murders and genocides. Since United Nations (UN) declared genocide an international crime in 1946, and published, in 1948, the Convention on Prevention and Punishment of Genocide, scholars have tried to better understand this phenomenon in order to avoid it. The Article II of the Genocide Convention defines genocide as the “acts committed with intent to destroy, in whole or part, a national, ethnical, racial, or religious groups”. However, the first draft of the document included the category of “political groups” among those threatened by extermination, but it was rejected by the USSR and its allies, worried about the possible international sanctions they might suffer for persecuting internal political enemies (HARFF, 2003).

Genocide Convention have been the cornerstone for legislation intending to prevent and punish these type of mass murders, but other treated have also helped to stress the importance of the matter. The International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, adopted by the UN in 1966, states on the Article 20 that is prohibited any propaganda for war as well as any advocacy of national or religious hatred that constitutes incitement to discrimination, hostility of violence by law. For as much as political freedom has been guaranteed by the majority of the international laws, agreements and legislation, political hatred has not been object of any sanction. This help to explain why major

research about genocide have not addressed hypothesis of political mass murders as their leading study cases. By the same token, hate speech studies and legislation use to draw upon the United Nations definition of genocide to set potential target groups (ALLPORT, 1979; WALDRON, 2012).

Although an event of such magnitude in Brazil seems to be an extremely distant picture, there were no success in preventing political mass murders so far, that is, what defines the eruption of events like these still can't be tracked. But there are a few common features that are assumed as preconditions to pave the way to assassination: political upheaval and hate speech, both blanket in Brazilian political context.

## 2 Language of contention and the hatred tide

If the uncivil speeches among Brazilian political discourse are common, it was only in some point between 2013 and 2014, that the average skilled Brazilian political speaker began to deal with a new locution on its vocabulary: hate speech. To Jeremy Waldron (2012), hate speech must be seen as the potential harm that publicized discourses may unleash. He is worried with those expressions or rhetoric that present risks to the assurance that society should offer to its citizens, that is, the assurance that the individual or group won't be subject of abuse, defamation, humiliation, discrimination, and violence.

Regarding political speeches, Patrick Charadeau (2015) says that the debate of ideas allows many strokes. He believes that *ethos* and *pathos* are ahead in relevance than truth, in politics. According to this stance, Political Discourse would belong to a different speech dimension, apart from our daily basis, since character and emotions would be elements to be played in order to accomplish a given goal; and conflict, an almost sure thing. But is it possible to completely detach politics from our ordinary speeches? We don't think so. On the contrary, we believe that the engagement with politics is key, and once a tension or emotion is aroused, it's much more likely that it will be carried onto the following topic, rather than just disappear.

Sidney Tarrow (2013), by his turn, explored how meanings, words and expressions are created and assumed as repertoires of political contention. Addressing the matter slightly differently than Charadeau, Tarrow says that, even language alone might not drive people to conflict, but it plays an important role in the construction, endurance and diffusion of contentious politics. According to him, political actors constitute themselves as parts of an interactive repertoire of contention "that is both behavioral and discursive" (2013, p. 15) and the diffusion of the contentious language would respond to

strategies of discourses, and culture. Intended to last, arising in the mist of political struggles, the repertoires of contention, as dynamic as they may be, becomes the natural way to express any political matters.

To Judith Butler (1997, p. 74), such utterances can be seen as the “*modus vivendi* of power itself”. She sustains that verbal conducts “may undermine the addressee’s capacity to work, to study or... exercise his or her constitutionally guaranteed rights and liberties”. By saying that, she sustains that the repertoires of contention may provoke physical effects on the addressee of a speech.

The field of political language assumes that words have the power to unite or divide groups of people (JARVIS; STEPHENS, 2015). When Gordon Allport (1979) worked on prejudice, he featured the concepts of ‘verbal rejection’ and ‘antilocution’ as those representing the lowest degree of prejudice. He believed that those expressions could lead to events such as the Jew genocide, presenting a scale of intensity on rejection of out-groups that would go from antilocution to extermination, often, with the progression from one state to the other “antilocution – discrimination – physical violence” (ALLPORT, 1979, p. 57). Recent research on the field provided newest terms to address the rhetoric strategies – strokes Charadeau talks about – which are responsible to communicate a party or politician’s intention to divide. The most common are: uncivil speech, outrage and incivility (SOBIERAJ; BERRY, 2011). They basically mean a language behavior which is contrary to respect and courtesy (BLACK; WOLFE, 2015), a language that intends to raise the level of arousal creating emotional reaction (MUTZ, 2007) and can be related to hateful speeches (HERBST, 2010).

### **3 Clipping and methodology**

Considering the goals of this study, four events were selected to represent, in terms of significance and magnitude, the major political happenings prior to 2018 presidential run: the 2014 presidential election; the impeachment of Dilma Rousseff (2015); the conviction of the former president Lula (2017); and his arrest, accused of corruption and money laundering (2018). For each one, by Content Analysis, were investigated the political discourses from media actors, political characters, social movements, political parties and media outlets (2 daily newspapers, 2 weakly magazines, one television network), in order to identify on the statements, frequency and type, taking advantage of the Willian Benoit’s Functional Theory of Political Campaign Discourse (2007).

In order to do that, we had to come up with the hypothesis of the “permanent campaigning”. By this, politics’ popularity in outlets like

social media demanded from politicians and political agents a 24/7 behavior as if they were indeed campaigning. Benoit's theory states that candidates establish discourses preferability, through acclaiming, attacking and defending, in order to seek votes; and that political discourse can occur on two broad topics: policy – issues - and character - image (BENOIT, 2007). We counter the occurrence of these elements, completing the framework, elements regarding polarization: media/ PT, and voters/PT, and finally, we will also seek for expressions that can be counted as political hate speech. considering Jeremy Waldron's (2012) understanding of the matter.

By filling Table 1, we identified the most common discourse strategies, as well as the most frequent narratives on each side of the current perceived political polarization in Brazil. The same was done to five players of the mainstream media, disclosing their positionings.

**Table 1**

Actors	Polarization Media x PT	Polarization Opposers x PT	Attacks on Policies	Attacks on Character	Acclaims on Policies	Acclaims on Character	Hate Speech	Total
Media Actors	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Political Actors	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Social Movements	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Political Parties	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
<b>Total</b>	<b>0</b>	<b>0</b>	<b>0</b>	<b>0</b>	<b>0</b>	<b>0</b>	<b>0</b>	<b>0</b>
Media	Polarization Media x PT	Polarization Opposers x PT	Attacks on Policies	Attacks on Character	Acclaims on Policies	Acclaims on Character	Hate Speech	Total
Folha de São Paulo	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
O Estado de São Paulo	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Revista Veja	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Carta Capital	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Rede Globo	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
<b>Total</b>	<b>0</b>	<b>0</b>	<b>0</b>	<b>0</b>	<b>0</b>	<b>0</b>	<b>0</b>	<b>0</b>

This first section intended to set forth the polarization climate in the eve of the 2018 presidential run. Provided with data, was possible to relate political discourses in terms of the development of mass conflict. All the discourses analyzed in the paper were originally published in television, newspapers, magazines, radio, internet, and were lately accessed through the world wide web. The criteria to select the discourses was the equivalency between supporters and opposers of the PT government regarding time, period and outlets of diffusion.

## 4 The 2014 Presidential Election

Prior demonstrations against the Worker's Party government wasn't the only issue rising the tensions during the 2014 presidential run. Brazilian economy was starting to give signs of retraction and, after 12 years, opposition was excited with a possibility of taking back the presidential chair from PT. Running for reelection, Dilma Rousseff sized her unpopularity during the 2014 FIFA World Cup open ceremony, when she was massively booed, to the point of giving up from her speech<sup>2</sup>.

The list of main challengers featured Eduardo Campos, from Brazilian Socialist Party (PSB), holding in the second position at the polls, and Aécio Neves, from Brazilian Social Democratic Party (PSDB), in third. After a plane crash that took the life of Eduardo Campos, just a couple months before the balloting, his substitute, Marina Silva, took the task of facing the incumbent, Rousseff. She ended up suffering with a visceral campaign from its adversaries, and at the last minute, Aécio Neves, former governor of the State of Minas Gerais, took the second place to reedit, by the fourth time since 2002, a second round (10) between PT x PSDB for the presidential chair. Table 2 shows the results for political speeches prior to the 2014 final balloting.

<sup>2</sup> In defense of Dilma's government, supporters said that those were the voices of the elite, the only ones that could pay for the tickets.

**Table 2 - The 2014 Presidential Campaign Analysis**

Political Actors	Polarization Media x PT	Polarization Opposers x PT	Attacks on Policies	Attacks on Character	Acclaims on Policies	Acclaims on Character	Hate Speech
<b>Opposition</b>							
Arnaldo Jabour	0	1	7	2	0	0	2
Aécio Neves	0	1	11	0	4	4	0
MBL	3	2	6	2	0	0	1
PSDB	0	2	10	0	25	0	0
<b>Total</b>	<b>3</b>	<b>6</b>	<b>34</b>	<b>4</b>	<b>9</b>	<b>4</b>	<b>3</b>
<b>Supporters</b>							
Gregório Duvivier	0	5	3	5	2	0	3
Dilma Rousseff	0	0	1	0	8	0	0
MTST	0	2	9	2	1	0	1
PT	16	18	30	5	65	18	2
<b>Total</b>	<b>16</b>	<b>25</b>	<b>43</b>	<b>12</b>	<b>76</b>	<b>18</b>	<b>6</b>
<b>Media</b>							
Media	Polarization Media x PT	Polarization Opposers x PT	Attacks on Policies	Attacks on Character	Acclaims on Policies	Acclaims on Character	Hate Speech
Folha de São Paulo	0	0	3	0	0	0	0
O Estado de São Paulo	2	0	1	1	1	0	0
Revista Veja	1	0	2	0	0	0	0
Carta Capital	1	0	3	2	3	0	0
Rede Globo	1	0	0	0	0	0	0



Opposing to Dilma's recommencement, the most common narratives used to denounce corruption inside the PT government, and the alleged risk of losing democratic quality in the case of Dilma's victory. It was sustained relating Brazil to countries like Bolivia and Venezuela, facing crisis after years of leftist governments. The relation between PT and media was also often referred, forcing Dilma to defend herself from the possibility of passing laws establishing more control over the media.

By its turn, government supporter's narratives focused on dividing history in before and after PT government; and society, in "elite" and the "people". Three of the four political actors referred to the act of voting as a matter of "us against them". Utilizing the idea of class struggle, as well as vilifying words to refer to PSDB, even relating Aécio supporters to Nazis while Dilma's with to Jews, the rhetoric of fear, displacement, was far more incendiary than their counterparts. And also, the mainstream media was represented as the enemy. The use of vilifying words, by expressions such as "they tried to terminate our race", uttered by the Worker's Party President, Ruy Falcão, are extremely divisive and created the perception of life being threatened to the ingroups.

A couple of days before the balloting, weekly magazine *Veja* anticipated its edition featuring in the cover Dilma Rousseff and Luís Inácio Lula da Silva over the headline: "They knew it all". The story was about a testimony accusing both politicians as accomplices of a major corruption scheme inside Petrobrás, Brazilian biggest Estate company. Following the publication's turmoil, *Veja* publisher's headquarters was attacked.

## **5 The Impeachment of Dilma Rousseff in 2016**

Even before the 2014 Presidential campaign resume, some voices were claiming for the possibility of impeachment, in case of Dilma Rousseff's victory. Once elected, with the economy shrinking and the Car-wash operation, held by Justice and Federal Police, putting on the ropes high directors of PT, demonstrations escalated through the country in opposition to her continuity. The small difference in the balloting (3,28%), also didn't quite helped the winner to face the opposition's determination to open a process against her. Nor the interest of her VP, Michel Temer.

In March, April, August, and December 2015, unprecedented demonstrations, supporting both the Car-Wash operation and the installation of the impeachment process on Dilma, were held in the streets. By the end that year, the Federal Chamber finally accepted

a controversial and very technical complaint against the President, calling for a “crime of responsibility”, and a commission was formed to decide about the opening or not for the process of impeachment.

<sup>3</sup> <https://www.gazetadopovo.com.br/rodrigo-constantino/artigos/milicianos-petistas-agridem-patriotas-nas-ruas/>

**Image 3 - Demonstrators fight in São Paulo.**



Fonte: Gazeta do Povo<sup>3</sup>

Tensions went high in the streets. Demonstrators, both supporting and opposing Dilma’s government, were held at the same time, but in different places, and controlled by the police, determined to avoid contact between participants. Still, many cases of violence were registered.

In March of 2016, when the investigation on the former President Luís Inácio Lula da Silva began, Rousseff were caught on a wire acting to guarantee that he wouldn’t go to jail on a preventive detention. The telephone call, recorded by the Federal Police (PF) was illegally released to the media by order of the holding judge on the case by the time, Sergio Moro. Turning public the move, but disqualifying the evidence, made with suspicions was raised about the Judge’s impartiality. Hero for some, target of hatred for others, the Judge would become one of the icons of this polarization.

On April/2016, Congress votes for the impeachment of Dilma. She is removed from the office, and Michel Temer, the former VP, is sworn as the new President. The act was called a *coup d’état* by the left, denouncing Temer and the media as its major perpetrators.

**Table 3 - The impeachment on Dilma Analysis**

Actors	Polarization Media x PT	Polarization Opposers x PT	Attacks on Policies	Attacks on Character	Acclaims on Policies	Acclaims on Character	Hate Speech
<b>Opposition</b>							
Marco Antônio Villa	0	10	10	20	0	0	7
Michel Temer	0	0	2	1	32	20	0
Vem prá Rua	0	1	29	13	0	8	3
PSDB	0	1	20	15	1	0	1
<b>Total</b>	<b>0</b>	<b>12</b>	<b>61</b>	<b>49</b>	<b>33</b>	<b>28</b>	<b>11</b>
<b>Supporters</b>							
Juca Kfourri	0	1	4	15	6	1	4
Dilma Rousseff	2	5	39	6	13	26	5
MST	0	1	13	7	7	0	6
PT	4	11	54	34	13	19	1
<b>Total</b>	<b>6</b>	<b>18</b>	<b>110</b>	<b>62</b>	<b>39</b>	<b>46</b>	<b>16</b>
<b>Media</b>							
Folha de São Paulo	0	0	1	4	2	2	0
O Estado de São Paulo	1	0	3	4	0	1	0
Revista Veja	0	0	26	6	0	2	0
Carta Capital	6	9	22	28	6	26	10
Rede Globo	1	0	0	2	0	0	0

Tabel 3 shows that the polarization escalated from 2014 to 2016. The number of attacks, incitement on polarization, and even the hate speech discourses, increased proportionally. In favor of the impeachment, the fiercest actor was Marco Antônio Villa, pundit at the radio, TV and internet. In one of his appearances, he says that Lula is inciting political cleavage and conflict. The historian alarms for the possibility of a social clash with violent outcomes given the nature of the inflammatory discourses of Lula and his followers, before calling Dilma “a simple creature” and an “accident of history”. By its turn, the social movement “Vem pra Rua” posted a video with public personalities calling people to take part on the demonstrations. Finally, a PSDB speech accused Dilma of being unable to govern because she didn’t have the ability to run a country.

By the side of PT and Dilma’s supporters, indignant reactions were expected because of the size of the loss: a government and its projects. Indignation went explicit. The cornerstone of the narratives takes the impeachment as a *coup d’état*, organized by the “elite”, with the help of the “justice” and “mainstream media”. These ideas were repeated by 75% of the actors and prevailed as the explanation to what happened in 2016 among Brazilian left. The ideas of fight, combat and resistance are also reinforced by 75% of the actors. The social movement “MST” a traditional PT

ally, posited themselves as an “army” ready to take the streets against what they called a “liberal insurgence”.

Mainstream media, by its turn, featured the day of the impeachment as an historical moment to Brazilian democracy. The weekly *Veja* declared the decease of the Worker’s Party, while the daily TV news featured the reactions - and violence - during demonstrations in support of Dilma. And *Carta Capital*, a weekly magazine ran by Mino Carta, reinforce its role as the major representative of the left in the media - aside the internet blogs. Opinions articles in *Carta Capital* gone strong in defense of Dilma. The opening text called the impeachment a “tragic farce”, supported and put in action by the “lack of intelligence” of Brazilian people. Carta’s rhetoric, partial and strongly divisive, is very different from the other mainstream media outlets.

By the time of the impeachment, PT party published a manifesto calling the partisans to “unify command words”, concerning with shaping a homogenous narrative that would work unifying and reinforcing their version of the event. It would work by the psychological principle of *priming*, activating cognitive constructs which would lead to subsequent social judgments on the matter.

In terms of hate speech, the analysis on both sides of the issue (supporters and opposers of Dilma) shows an increase of its use. Mostly, because of the repetition of vilifying words to describe the opponents. Among the Rousseff’s supporters’ speeches, “class struggle”, “class hatred”, “us against them” expressions were extensively repeated. Simplifications like addressing the impeachment as an act of the “international bourgeoisie interested in precluding the pre-salt oil taxes from going to Brazilian education and health system”, was uttered by the MST leader, João Stedile. The recalling of a contentious language, carried with pejorative meaning, appears when the impeachment is pictured as a “new reorganization of the US hegemony over Latin America”. Dilma Rousseff also addresses her withdrawn as a “misogynous, homophobic and racist” coup, stretching the meaning of the event in something that could be seen as an attempt to galvanize minorities around her cause. The role of justice was also questioned with hatred, mostly by the repeated attacks on the character the Judge, Sergio Moro. On the other hand, the opposers’ champion on hate speech is Marco Antônio Villa, who dehumanizes Dilma by calling her a “zombie”, a “political puppet on the hands of former president Lula”, and repeats that she was an inefficient ruler and responsible for all the bad things that was happening in Brazil.

## **6 July, 2017: Lula convicted**

In the beginning 2017, Lula suffered the loss of his wife, Marisa Leticia, victim of a stroke. On July, he was declared guilty

of corruption and money laundering, by Judge Sergio Moro, on the first of three lawsuits he had against him. A nine years sentence that would be augmented to 12 years by the second entrance court. Lula was accused of being the *de facto* owner of a beach front apartment, in Guarujá, São Paulo, which would have been received as a bribe, from one of the biggest construction companies in Brazil, Odebrecht.

The investigation on the former President have been covered by mainstream media in details. At the same time, Lula denied the accusation and was preparing to run for Presidency in 2018. By the time of the trial, a poll ran by DataFolha, showed him in first place, with 30% of the voting intention. The second was Jair Bolsonaro, a conservative hardliner, from the irrelevant Social Christian Party (PSC), with an incendiary discourse. Bolsonaro managed to get 15% of the voting intentions, and displaced the traditional PSDB party candidate<sup>4</sup>. It was the first time, in more than 20 years, that a right winger got that position, pointing that polarization has reached paramount.

Throughout the investigation, demonstrations were held both in favor and against the conviction of the former President Lula. During his speeches, Lula started to attribute the death of his wife to a mediatic and judicial persecution he and his family was suffering.

<sup>3</sup> The same poll revealed the Brazilian ideological profile at the time. The findings pointed to 41% of the Brazilians identified with the left, 40% with the right, and 20 % with the center. Comparing to the same research in 2014, the results pointed to a shrinking right (45% to 40%), a growing left (35% to 41%), mostly caused by the identification with behavioral issues, while the economy factor kept stable, still pointing to a little preference among Brazilians to a liberal market.

**Table 4 - Lula is convicted**

Actors	Polarization Media x PT	Polarization Opposers x PT	Attacks on Policies	Attacks on Character	Acclaims on Policies	Acclaims on Character	Hate Speech
<b>Opposition</b>							
Marco Antonio Villa	0	4	35	6	0	0	4
João Dória	0	4	0	5	1	1	1
Kim Kataguiri	1	3	1	3	0	1	1
PSDB	0	7	2	13	8	2	1
<b>Total</b>	<b>1</b>	<b>18</b>	<b>38</b>	<b>27</b>	<b>9</b>	<b>4</b>	<b>7</b>
<b>Supporters</b>							
Paulo Henrique Amorim	7	0	0	15	0	10	7
Gleisi Hoffman	7	5	26	33	6	7	5
MST	0	1	4	0	0	0	3
Psol	1	1	6	5	11	3	2
<b>Total</b>	<b>15</b>	<b>7</b>	<b>36</b>	<b>52</b>	<b>17</b>	<b>20</b>	<b>17</b>
<b>Media</b>							
Media	Polarization Media x PT	Polarization Opposers x PT	Attacks on Policies	Attacks on Character	Acclaims on Policies	Acclaims on Character	Hate Speech
Folha de São Paulo	0	0	1	1	2	2	0
O Estado de São Paulo	0	0	1	0	0	0	0
Revista Veja	1	0	2	1	0	0	1
Carta Capital	0	2	1	0	0	0	5
Rede Globo	1	1	0	1	0	1	0

Although the activism in the streets lost intensity, compared to 2015 and 2016, and the same happened with some features of the political discourses, the percentage of hatred appeared to raise. In opposition to Lula and PT, narratives focused on the Party and its leader corruption. The discourses incited polarization by dividing the society between “the good people” who would be pleased with the conviction of the former president, and the “others”, supporters of PT and its corruption practices. Some narratives established the judge Moro as a hero, for convicting Lula. In regard of hate speeches, Marco Antônio Villa, again, referred the possible end of Lula and PT by a death metaphor: ‘the last act on Lula and PT’s political death’. Meanwhile, the social movement MBL resorted to the old strategy of publishing grotesque images, in order to dehumanize Lula supporters.

In favor of Lula and PT, the attacks were focused on the (in) Justice and the personally of judge Moro. 100% of the discourses featured strong critics to the investigation and the trial, and suggested Moro didn’t had enough proves to condemn Lula. According to these narratives, Moro did it anyway in accountability to the public opinion and the media. The idea of a maneuver to take Lula out the presidential run was reinforced in every discourse analyzed. Mainstream media was accounted for the conviction by Senator Gleisy Hoffmann, at *TV Senado*, and the pundit Paulo Henrique Amorim, former TV Globo reporter, in his Youtube channel. Between the accusations, Amorim said that Moro was employed at Rede Globo, and finally, repeated the words of Lula about the former first lady, saying that “the lies of Globo killed Dona Marisa”.

The mediatic discourses analyzed were the TV news *Jornal Nacional*, from Rede Globo, and the covers of two newspapers and magazines, *Folha de São Paulo*, *O Estado de São Paulo*, *Veja* and *Carta Capital*. Except for *Carta Capital*, all the outlets (80%) referred to the case as “the first conviction of a former president because of a common crime in history”. The television news from Globo was methodic while presenting the sentence to the audience. It analyzed the conviction document, trying to show how the judge More get to his decision, and this scrutiny on the sentence, could have been seen as an attempt to endorse the conviction of Lula. Newspapers was worried with polarization, and pointed to the demonstrations held both in support of Lula or in support of the Car-Wash operation. *Folha de São Paulo* said that Lula was the first former Republic President to be sentenced, but the third former president of the Worker’s Party to be in that position.

**Image 4** - Weekly magazine covers on former president Lula's conviction



Veja magazine featured in the cover a closeup picture of Lula, with his hand covering part of his face, like he was ashamed. The picture highlights Lula's lack of a finger, by what grotesque appears again to be considered incitement to hatred. Carta Capital, by its turn, features a slavery painting in the cover, resembling to Brazilian past, with the phrase "Casa-Grande celebrates", recalling the "casa-grande", major symbol of Brazilian oppressive past of slavery. Rhetoric of the weekly magazine reinforces the polarization while gives hatred arguments to shape the repertoire of words and expressions by which Lula would be defended on the public sphere.

## 7 Case 4: 2018 - Lula imprisoned

Lula's attorneys appealed for the two higher instances in Brazilian Justice, the Superior Tribunal of Justice (STJ) and the Supremo Tribunal Federal (STF) – equivalent of the Supreme Court in US - in order prevent with an *habeas corpus* from what they understood could be an early execution of the sentence against Lula. The first session, that received the plead, and the second one, that decided about its validity, were broadcasted on television, mobilized the media and called the world attention. The higher Brazilian Court understood that jurisprudence should prevail, frustrating Lula's attorneys, and returned the power of calling the Lula imprisonment to judge Sergio Moro. Barely with decision in hands, Moro expedites a warrant, and gave Lula 24 hours to present himself to the Federal Police headquarter, in Curitiba (PR), where the investigation was based.

It was the beginning of one of the most dramatic moments in political Brazilian history. Anxiety was felt throughout the country. Would Lula be arrested or try to seek asylum under political persecution? On April 7, outmarching in 26 hours the justice deadline, and after a big political act, he turned himself to justice. Before it, for two days and nights he stayed at the metalworker's union headquarters, the place where he dad began his political trajectory, in São Bernardo do Campo (SP). With him, thousands of supporters surrounding the place, and avoiding Police and the press from getting close. On the morning of April 7, the political act started with a cult in memory of the former first lady, Marisa, when Lula, once again, blame media and justice for her death.

**Image 5** - Lula is about to turn himself into justice at his political birthplace, the metalworkers' headquarters in São Bernardo do Campo, SP.



Fonte: Francisco Proner / the intercept brasil

Even after his imprisonment, Lula kept the forefront in the polls for the presidency. DataFolha showed Lula with 31%, followed by Jair Bolsonaro with 15%, while Ibope showed Lula with 20%, followed by Bolsonaro with 14%.

The narrative against Lula focused on the good and bad dichotomy. It's an old, but efficient, strategy of segregation, while also keeps the unity of a given group. An institutional note from PSDB addressed to the STF Supreme Court, before the judgment that allowed his imprisonment, said that an eventual freedom of Lula would be like "kneeling to political pressures" and mocking over the people that lives according to the law in Brazil. Days after the arrest, congressman



Magno Malta, evangelic and conservative, strong critic of PT government, called Lula a thief, and accused him of manufacturing the moment of his imprisonment for mediatic use. Malta addressed his religious community inciting hatred, claiming for “morality and honor against Lula” and accusing the former President of being drunk during the cult in memory of his late wife: “Drunk, drunk, drunk” screamed Malta in a video published on his Youtube account.

By the supporter’s side, there were even more intensity on the discourses. Luís Nassif, a commentator for newspapers, tv and internet, call the arrest on Lula a fascist act, resulted from a fascist tide who persecuted the former president and his party. He criticized the justice and tried to promote fear by saying that “anytime, the Federal Police can knock at your door and take you in custody”. The social movement Central Única dos Trabalhadores (CUT) said that the process didn’t presented any proof, while attacked justice and the media. The idea perpetrated was of Lula’s imprisonment as a result of an elite prejudice and ripping of the Constitution. The Worker’s Party repeated the metaphor of a ripped constitution and declared the act as a violence against Lula. Again, the kneeling accusation against the STF Supreme Court, but this time, called by the Lula supporters. Alert for the raise of an exception state, creating fear and inciting hatred among his fellows.

The speech of Lula, delivered at the headquarters of the Metalworker’s Union at São Bernardo do Campo, SP, is the climax of the act by which he turned himself to justice. Loaded with symbolic images of resistance, religiosity, and even the return, once there was the place where Lula started his career, the performative act featured by far the acclaims on his character as the main element of the speech, helping to build the moment with even more symbolism. When he the attacks, delivers equally to character and policies, but focus on the personalities involved with his conviction, the Judge Moro and the persecutors, and the institution of justice as a whole. He namely blames the Prosecution and the press for the death of his wife, addressing the mainstream media TV outlets Rede Globo, Bandeirantes, Rede Record as liars. He says: “from now on you are Lula. Let’s ‘re-lular’ the media so that people won’t be victim of lies every single day. You can burn tires, demonstrate, occupy... my friends are the ones who have the guts to invade a land build homes, strike, occupy a farm”. One of the most iconic moment is when he says that he became more than flesh and bone, that with his imprisonment, he is an idea in the mind of the people, and ideas can’t be silenced, ideas can’t die.

Only authorized press was able to get to the metalworker’s headquarters. While covering the act, teams of *Rede Bandeirantes* and *Rede Globo* were threatened and had their equipment damaged. A car from Rede Bandeirantes had its windshields broken.

The media highlighted the attacks the press suffered while covering the act of Lula. There is a disorder element on the discourses of *Rede Globo*, *Folha de São Paulo* and revista *Veja*. The television gave full covering to the event since day one, April 5<sup>th</sup>, with the cable channel 'GloboNews' permanently live following the unfolding of the process. *Jornal Nacional*, the major audience in Brazilian TV News, opened that Saturday's edition with the live link to the airport when the plane taking Lula from São Paulo to Curitiba was running through the runway and then taking off. The news replayed points of Lula's speech at São Bernardo, when he attacked the justice, threatened the press, and incited invasions and demonstrations. Then, the news gave place to the judge of the Car-Wash and shows him conceding an interview to a Chinese television network. Goes back to the case presenting a detailed explanation of the case that took Lula to jail.

**Table 5 - Lula is arrested**

Actors	Polarization Media x PT	Polarization Opposers x PT	Attacks on Policies	Attacks on Character	Acclaims on Policies	Acclaims on Character	Hate Speech
<b>Opposition</b>							
Arnaldo Jabor	0	3	0	1	0	5	0
Magno Malta	0	6	12	25	9	11	3
MBL	0	5	0	5	0	0	0
PSDB	0	4	3	2	0	0	2
<b>Total</b>	<b>0</b>	<b>18</b>	<b>15</b>	<b>33</b>	<b>9</b>	<b>16</b>	<b>5</b>
<b>Supporters</b>							
Luis Nassif	0	4	23	11	0	1	4
Lula	18	9	26	25	32	68	5
CUT	3	4	4	4	1	22	1
PT	1	1	8	3	1	6	4
<b>Total</b>	<b>22</b>	<b>18</b>	<b>61</b>	<b>43</b>	<b>34</b>	<b>97</b>	<b>14</b>
<b>Media</b>							
Media	Polarization Media x PT	Polarization Opposers x PT	Attacks on Policies	Attacks on Character	Acclaims on Policies	Acclaims on Character	Hate Speech
Folha de São Paulo	2	0	0	3	0	0	0
O Estado de São Paulo	1	0	0	1	0	0	0
Revista Veja	2	1	0	3	0	0	0
Carta Capital	2	6	6	12	0	7	4
Rede Globo	5	3	0	5	0	0	0

The exceptionality of the covering confirmed the symbolism of the moment. No one could take from Lula what he was and what he done: a populist leader, who cared for the masses, launching and strengthening important social policies, during a time of economic growth. However, now he was a convicted man, for corruption and money laundering, and the scandals and suspicions he was involved started to show a different face of his government.

The covers of the two newspapers, *Folha de São Paulo* and *O Estado de São Paulo*, highlighted with pictures the moments prior and after Lula have turned himself to justice and repeated the “first time of a former president arrested” discourse. The covers remit to the political moment of polarization, but also, to the disorder and disobedience Lula was behind. *Veja Magazine* featured a cover of redress, with a caricature of Lula behind bars and the headline: “Corrupt in jail”. The cover also denounces an alleged staging performance of Lula, and the attacks press suffered during the event. *Carta Capital*, by its turn, speaks completely in support of Lula, calling again the ideas of inquisition, exception state, coup, and threatens saying that “worst days are about to come. Social tensions may worsen the actual crisis from every point-of-view, leading the end of the year to an even more astonishing conjuncture than the cancellation of the election for the sake of national peace”.

## 8 Overall results

Table six shows the overall results for the analysis of the discourses. By the observation of the four tables, is possible to make assumptions about the development of each strategy of discourse, as well as in regard of incitements to polarization and the use of hate speech rhetoric.

**Tabel 6 - The overall results**

Actors	Polarization Media x PT	Polarization Opposers x PT	Attacks on Policies	Attacks on Character	Acclaims on Policies	Acclaims on Character	Hate Speech	Total
<b>Opposition</b>								
Media Actors	0	18	52	29	0	5	13	117
Political Actors	0	11	25	31	16	36	4	123
Social Movements	4	11	36	23	0	9	5	84
Political Parties	0	14	35	30	34	2	4	119
<b>Total</b>	<b>4</b>	<b>54</b>	<b>148</b>	<b>113</b>	<b>60</b>	<b>52</b>	<b>26</b>	
<b>Supporters</b>								
Media Actors	7	10	30	35	8	12	18	120
Political Actors	27	19	92	39	59	101	15	453
Social Movements	3	8	30	9	9	22	11	92
Political Parties	22	31	98	44	90	46	9	340
<b>Total</b>	<b>59</b>	<b>68</b>	<b>293</b>	<b>139</b>	<b>242</b>	<b>194</b>	<b>59</b>	
<b>Media</b>								
	Polarization Media x PT	Polarization Opposers x PT	Attacks on Policies	Attacks on Character	Acclaims on Policies	Acclaims on Character	Hate Speech	Total
Folha de São Paulo	2	0	5	8	4	4	0	23
O Estado de São Paulo	4	0	5	6	1	1	0	17
Revista Veja	4	1	30	10	0	2	1	47
Carta Capital	9	17	34	42	9	33	19	163
Rede Globo	7	4	0	8	0	1	0	20
<b>Total</b>	<b>26</b>	<b>22</b>	<b>74</b>	<b>74</b>	<b>14</b>	<b>41</b>	<b>20</b>	

Starting with incitement to polarization, is possible to say by the analysis that it developed reaching the higher point with the discourses around the arresting of Lula. The Media vs. PT Government incitement comes mostly from Lula itself, during the 2014 election and again, by the time of his imprisonment. The analysis also found that Carta Capital discourses works differently from the other media outlets. The majority of elements marked in the tables came from Carta Capital speeches, but this didn't quite work in terms of the incitement to polarization Media vs. PT Government. There is a tenue equivalence between Carta and Globo, despite most of the Globo incitement be reactive to the very incitement.

Once at stake the incitement Opposers vs. PT supporters, it was bigger by the 2014 presidential election, and the major founts of utterances are the media actors (comentators) and the PSDB party, by the side of the Opposition to PT government; and politicians and PT party, by the side of the supporters of PT government. Even with these utterances being more frequent four years ago, there is still a strong recurrence to this rhetoric over the years and is expected that the next presidential campaign will raise the level again, like happened in 2014. The media, by its turn, doesn't get relevant markers on the issue, except for Carta Capital, during the impeachment and the Lula's arresting.

In terms of hate speech like discourses, the commentators again are the main users of the rhetoric. On the opposition side of the table, politicians, social movements and political parties indeed used hatred arguments, but not quite as much as media actors. On the supporter's side, same goes to media actors, but there is a much stronger participation from the politicians and social movements.

**Table 7 - Preferred strategies**

Opposers repertoire		Supporters repertoire		Media repertoire	
Attacks on Policies	148	Attacks on Policies	293	Attacks on Policies	74
Attacks on Character	113	Acclaim on Policies	242	Attacks on Character	74
Acclaim on Policies	60	Acclaim on Character	194	Acclaim on Character	41*
Polarization on voters	54	Attacks on Character	139	Polarization on media	26
Acclaim on Character	52	Polarization on voters	68	Polarization on voters	22
Hate Speech	26	Polarization on media	59	Hate speech	20 *
Polarization on Media	4	Hate Speech	59	Acclaim on Policies	14 *

\*Media acclaims on character have 33 of 41 made by Carta Capital; hate speech have 19/20, and acclaim on policies 9/14.

In regard of the strategy of the speeches, table 7 shows what each category (opposers, supporters, and media) establish as their preferred repertoire. From the William Benoit (2007) Functional Theory of Political

Campaign Discourse perspective, there is an initial incongruence: the preference for attacks rather than acclaims. On the other hand, there is studies arguing that the independent voters respond only to negative advertising (ANSOLABEHERE; IYENGAR, 1995). Hence, the strategy of attack can be considered a sort of negative advertisement intended to win the votes of those who are not committed with one side or another. Other than that, the policy comments being more frequent than the character ones is in accordance with the Benoit's theory.

## 9 Final Considerations

By the analysis of the four event's political discourses, considering its contexts, it is possible to make some assumptions. To begin, is relevant to say that there is no sign of mitigation in regard of the polarization between PT supporters and opposers. This is particularly important on the eve of a new political campaign, because traditionally the political excitement grow during such periods. For instance, the aftermath of 2007 Kenya presidential elections were a two-month humanitarian crisis that killed at least 1.500 people. As we can observe by the Brazilian 2014 election analysis, that was one of the biggest incendiary periods for political discourses. So, it would be expected to happen again in 2018. The more dedicated the speeches are, the more increases the number of attacks and, hence, incitements of hatred and polarization.

Second, the incitement of polarization is not a prerogative of one of the sides. When taken independently, the incitement of polarization between voters is bigger on the PT opposers, reaching 11,8% against 6,8% of the supporters. But taking it together, the numbers are almost even: 12,6% for the opposers, and 12,0% for the supporters. So, the total percentage of the discourses inciting polarization, that is, going beyond the normal differences between one choice and another, is 12%. Same goes with hate speech. PT opposers discourses dedicated 5,6% of their speech time to incite hatred among their audiences, while the supporters dedicated 5,5%. Summing what was considered polarization and hate speech, there is 15% of the time of the speeches dedicated to excite distinct political identities, creating or reinforcing an already existent political cleavage.

In regard of media speeches, the cases analyzed by the study showed that 17,7% of the discourses were meant to incite polarization. However, 9,59% of it is due to Carta Capital alone. Same goes to hate speech, where Carta Capital uttered 19 of 20 hate speech like discourses. We know that have been covers of Veja dehumanizing or appealing to grotesque when the matter was Lula and Dilma. Sometimes it happens very subtilty, just like the highlight on a missing finger found during the conviction analysis on this study, and sometimes it is more expressive, like when both politicians were

pictured as the mythologic Medusa, with snakes instead of hair on their heads. But Carta Capital seems to go much beyond its media outlet role and its practices can easily be confused as an open PT government advocacy. The use of metaphors, repetition of expressions and symbols, the alleged lack of intelligence of those who opposed to Lula and Dilma, are mediatic discourses that can be compared, for instance, to those of the weekly *Der Stumer*, during the Third Reich. Furthermore, Carta Capital went all the way picturing an enemy, just misses the ordering for extermination.

In the beginning of the article we refer the Gordon Allport's work on prejudice (1979), where he sustains that the presence of antilocution is a conditional element in the development of cases which unfold on extreme violence, such as the genocides. These types of utterances have also been the subject of more recent studies, like the Susane Benesh' (2011), presented at the United Nations, and intended to provide a scheme capable of anticipate the outbreak of violence. According to Benesh' guidelines, five factors can be observed before the social violence erupts: (1) the speaker's influence power; (2) audience with fears or complaints that the speaker can cultivate; (3) a discourse understood as a call for violence; (4) social or historical context conducive to violence; (5) the influential spread. By these framework, we notice that Brazilian case can fills every factor, maybe except for the third and fourth. Considering the charismatic power of Lula (1), the left wing unified complaint and fear of a liberal take over and its consequences (2), and the influential spread of the democratized media (5), those are conditions already capable of turning an audience, like would say Schumpeter (1961, p. 330-331) "into a psychological mob getting to the frenzy situation where an argument intention does nothing but awaken the animal spirits". One could argue that the calling for resistance "until the last consequences" could be considered an ultimate to violence filling condition (3), and what we would have left is to consider or not Brazilian social historical context can be conducive to violence. Some would say yes, remembering not only the guerrillas' anti-military regime organized during the 60's and 70's, but the very Movimento dos Trabalhadores Sem-Terra (MST), that conducts and considers itself an organized army.

Barbara Harff (2003) by her turn, brings six preconditions for the occurrence of genocides and politicides: (1) Political upheaval; (2) Prior Genocides or habituation to mass killings; (3) Political systems with exclusionary ideologies and autocratic rule; (4) ethnic and religious cleavages; (5) Low economic development; and (6) International context, economic and political interdependence. Here, Brazil apparently is out of the danger of developing a case of such magnitude. Indeed, there is and there will be more political upheaval ahead (1); indeed, the intolerance demonstrated by the discourses both in opposition and in support of PT government represent the filling of condition (3);

(1) <http://www.ohchr.org/EN/ProfessionalInterest/Pages/CrimeOfGenocide.aspx>

(2) [https://treaties.un.org/Pages/ViewDetails.aspx?chapter=4&clang=en&mtdsg\\_no=IV-4&src=IND](https://treaties.un.org/Pages/ViewDetails.aspx?chapter=4&clang=en&mtdsg_no=IV-4&src=IND)

(3) Ibope survey institute asked to 2000 demonstrators the three main reasons for them to be in the streets protesting. Source: <http://g1.globo.com/brasil/linha-tempo-manifestacoes-2013/platb/>

(4) <https://noticias.uol.com.br/cotidiano/ultimas-noticias/2013/06/20/em-dia-de-maior-mobilizacao-protestos-levam-centenas-de-milhares-as-ruas-no-brasil.htm>

(5) <http://g1.globo.com/brasil/noticia/2013/06/protestos-pelo-pais-tem-125-milhao-de-pessoas-um-morto-e-confrontos.html>

(6) <https://blogdomariomagalhaes.blogosfera.uol.com.br/2014/07/09/rio-sao-paulo-e-bh-lideram-ranking-de-cidades-com-mais-protestos-na-copa/>

(7) <http://g1.globo.com/politica/noticia/2014/06/pelo-menos-13-pessoas-morreram-em-um-ano-de-protestos-pelo-pais.html>

(8) Waldron's concept regards race, ethnicity, religion, gender and, in some cases, sexual orientation as causes of hatred.

(9) Brazilian electoral rules states that, to win, the candidate must have 50% + 1 of the valid votes. If none of the candidates accomplish that number, a second round is called between the top two, to see who the winner will be.

(10) <http://www.pt.org.br/nota-oficial-resolucao-politica-contra-o-golpe/>

(11) <http://media.folha.uol.com.br/datafolha/2017/07/03/d2a8a-70683c9fa81dcaebffab0375823df-9674ca.pdf>

(12) <http://www.bbc.com/portuguese/brasil-43309946>

and indeed, the economy retraction and the high unemployment rates fills easily condition (5). The closest thing to a genocide Brazil have had participation occurred 150 years ago, at the Paraguay war, when Brazil, Argentina and Uruguay almost extinguished with the entire male population of that country. However, in 2017, Brazil was ranked number one in the world in violent deaths, registering 70.200 thousand murders. That is more than Syria. Among the 50 more violent cities in the World, 17 are Brazilian cities (13). So, there is some room for talk. The conditions four (ethnic and religious cleavages) are maybe one of the strongest so far in maintaining Brazil away from violence. Despite the ethnic disparities, Brazil doesn't have the same approach on race as, for instance, the US. Religiously and racially, the country is a multifaceted mosaic, dealing with differences but without hatred involved. However, political hatred seems to be taking the place of these potential issues, like the Freudian (FREUD, 1915 [1980]) escape valve tried to explain at the beginning of the XX century. Finally, the six condition, which would be the international context, economic and political interdependence. It would be very difficult for one of the ten biggest economies in the world, a position owed mostly to the exportation of primary goods, dependent of international manufactured products, and that have plead for years for a chair at the UN's Security Council to detach from of all these characteristics in order to foresee a possible outbreak of declared civil war. But if we look at the other side of the fence, to Venezuela, we must consider even that a strong supporting condition such as the international economic and political interdependence as capable of ruin.

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