THE PROHIBITION ON THE CALCULATION OF TIME FOR THE PURPOSE OF BENEFITS TO CIVIL SERVANTS IN COMPLEMENTARY LAW 173/2020: THE EXCEPTION CLAUSE AND WHY IT SHOULD BE UNDERSTOOD AS A RULE OF FINANCIAL LAW

Authors

• Jonas Faviero Trindade
• Caroline Müller Bitencourt

Abstract

The Coronavirus Pandemic has led to the adoption of measures to contain expenses, such as Complementary Law 173/2020, which prohibits the calculation of length of service for the granting of advantages that derive exclusively from the passage of time, a topic that has even been discussed in public civil actions, as a cause of action. LC 191/2022 created an exception clause, excluding its applicability to civil and military servants in the areas of health and security. What is the meaning and scope of the exception clause created by LC 191/2020? We examine how the Federal Supreme Court assessed the constitutionality of LC 173/2020 and interpret the prohibition rule, as well as revisiting two public civil lawsuits, which fought interpretative disputes over the meaning of the prohibition in question. Finally, the change introduced by LC 191/2022 is interpreted. This is monographic research, in which we engage in dialogue with legislation and case law, in order to be proactive about the meaning of the law. It was concluded that LC 173/2020, including the changes made by LC 191/2022, is a rule of financial law, drawn up in a very significant context, which will have an impact on its interpretation/application to specific cases. The arguments that this regulation violates the rules of initiative (formal unconstitutionality) or federative autonomy (material unconstitutionality) are inadequate, since its primary purpose is not to create or definitively extinguish statutory rights, even if its application entails remuneration consequences for civil servants after it comes into force. It is a rule of financial law, since its purpose is essentially to preserve public accounts.