Performance of regulatory agencies in road concessions in Brazil: implications of the agent-principal problem

Authors

  • Graciela Aparecida Profeta Universidade Federal Fluminense
  • Viviani Silva Lirio Universidade Federal de Viçosa
  • Elke Silva Santos

DOI:

https://doi.org/10.17058/redes.v21i1.5971

Keywords:

Regulatory agency. The principal-agent problem. Efficiency.

Abstract

Public infrastructure services have been offered by private companies with state participation through sectoral regulatory agencies. However, due the existence of typical problems of Agent-Principal relationship that sign these arrangements, there are questions related to efficient performance of these agencies. In this sense, the objective was to present and discuss the intrinsic characteristics of the performance of the regulatory agencies, and how they are susceptible to political influence and capture problems. It was concluded that despite authorities with financial and administrative independence, there are important points of laxity in the agencies acting regime, especially those ones linked to the nomination / appointment of certain directors from their government and to budget subordination. These aspects indicate the possibility of capture and political influence, which can affect the efficiency in the sector. However, despite lack of reformulation and law enforcement, the performance of the agencies is important for ensuring efficiency because the highway concessions sector in Brazil is concentrated and this may allow the opportunistic behavior of firms and governments at the time of bidding.

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Author Biography

Graciela Aparecida Profeta, Universidade Federal Fluminense

Professora Adjunta do Departamento de Ciências econômicas da Unidade de UFF em Campos dos Goytacazes. Atualmente é coordenadora do curso de economia, ministra disciplinas na rea de microeconomia e econometria e pesquisa temas com abordagens teóricas de organização industrial, economia regional e microeconomia.

Published

2016-05-06

How to Cite

Profeta, G. A., Lirio, V. S., & Santos, E. S. (2016). Performance of regulatory agencies in road concessions in Brazil: implications of the agent-principal problem. Redes , 21(1), 189-208. https://doi.org/10.17058/redes.v21i1.5971